Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1959

W. E. Bueche v. Charles E. Conner Co. : Appellants'
Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Robert H. Ruggeri; Warren C. Horton; Horton, Davis & McCaleb; Attorneys and Counsel for
Appellants;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Bueche v. Charles E. Conner Co., No. 8710 (Utah Supreme Court, 1959).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2878

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

In the Supreme Court
of the

W. E. BUECHE,
Respondent,

vs.
CHARLES E. CONNER COMPANY, WILUAM J. CONNER, and CHARLES E.
CONNER,
Appellants.

Appeal from
District Court,
Grand C'Ounty, Utah.
Honorable
L. Leland Larson,
Presiding.

APPELLANT'S' REPLY BRIEF.

RoBERT H. RuGGERI,
First Security Bank Bldg.,
Moab, Utah,
WARREN C. HoRToN,
HoRToN, D'AVIS & McCALEB,
208 South LaSalle Street,
Chicago, Illinois,
Attorneys a;nd Counsel for
Appella;nts.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
OCR,
may contain
errors.
THE QUNTHORP'·WARREN
P'IUNTINQ
COMPANY.
CHICAGO

TABL·E. OF CONTENTS.
PAGE

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
That Defendants Were Entitled to Judgment at the
Close of Plaintiff's Prima Facie Case Is Not Disputed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

2

Plaintiff's Statements of Fact Are Not Supported by
the Transcript Citations Made ................ 2, 3, 5, 6
Plaintiff's Point IV That a Party May Treat the
Other's Breach of an Agreement As an Offer to Rescind Is Neither Sound in La.w Nor Pertinent in
Fact As Stated by Plaintiff. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

If There Ever Was an Offer to Rescind, There Was
Never Any Acceptance Thereof. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10

The Contract Was Not Terminated in November, 1955
and the Plaintiff Himself Repeatedly Denied It....

9

The Plaintiff Considered the Contract in Effect at
Least as Late as May, 1956 as He Repeatedly Told
the Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

The Finding of Fact That the Contract Was Terminated in November, 1955 Is Not Supported by Any
Testimony and Was Expressly Denied by the Plaintiff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10

Even at the Time of Trial, Plaintiff Did Not Consider
the Contract Terminated Nor Did He Consider That
There Had Been Any Offer to Rescind Accepted
by Him .................................... ·. . . .

12

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the Supreme Court
of the

State of Utah
Appeal No. 8710.

W. E. BUECHE,

ReBpondent,

V8.

CHARLES E. CONNER COMPANY, WILUAM J. CONNER, and CHARLES E.
CONNER,
Appellants.

Appeal from
District Court,
Grand County, Utah.
Honorable
L. Leland Larson,
Presiding.

APPEL.LANT'S' REPLY BRIEF.
Forewo,rd.
The defendants-appellants find it necessary to reply to
the plaintiff's-Respondent's brief because of many inaccuracies therein, because of summary generalizations
therein which are misleading because of their generality,
and because plaintiff discloses a fundamental agreement
with defendants quite contrary to the Court's Findings
and Judgment.
The Memorandum Agreement quoted in plaintiff's brief
contains several typographical errors of omissions, repetitions and misplaced lines of type. This is represented
as being ''Exhibit 1' '. However ''Exhibit 1'' is a list of
disbursements (Tr. 38). The Agreement is made a part
of the pleadings.
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That Defendants Were Entitled to Judgment at the Close
of Plaintiff's Prima Facie Case Is Not Disputed.
As stated in Defendants'-Appellants' main brief, pages
18-22, plaintiff at the time he rested his prima facie case
had completely failed to sustain the allegations of his complaint. Motion for Judgment was made by defendants,
denied by the Court, renewed at the close of all the evidence and again denied. Plaintiff rested his prima facie
case at Transcript p. 160.
It is interesting therefore to note that in the plaintiff's
brief substantially all. references to the transcript, or to
·Exhibits said to support plaintiff's case, first occur after
plaintiff had rested (Tr. p. 160).
We have searched plaintiff's brief carefully. It makes
103 references to transcript pages. Of these references
by plaintiff, only 26 of the transcript pages referred to
relate to what occurred before plaintiff rested his case.
Not any of these pages tend to support the plaintiff's
burden. They do support the-- defense.
Plaintiff cited Tr. 33 as showing the defendants' expenses of a trip to Salt Lake City ("~hich fact is true),
hut no reference to such a trip appears on that page.
He cites Tr. 59 as sho,ving that ·\rilliam J. Conner worked
on the Lile and N e'v Castle claims ''in the late fall and
winter of 1955, and the early part of 1956' '. Yet that page
shows that the witness there questioned "-ras Charles E.
Conner, who expressly testified, "I rlon 't believe I could
answer that. I wasn't herP when the work began." The
pag-e reference in no way supports plaintiff's state1nent.
Pages 65-81 are cited by plaintiff as sho,ving various
i terns of expenses paid by defendants. Such items of
course support the defendan.ts' contentions.
Page 88 is cited as showing that Charles E. Conner
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''upon one occasion helped move a few trees out of the
roadway." That fact is true. If it is intended to represent that this was all that Charles E .. Conner did, then
it is not true. Apparently such is the intended representation of plaintiff's brief (p. 16), although it ignores the
undisputed testimony adduced by the plaintiff (Tr. 92, 93)
that Charles E. Conner was very busily engaged, and at
the instigation of plaintiff himself, throughout 1955 and
: 1956 in endeavoring to work out prospective n1ergers, and
incorporation, supervising the work in the mountains, at~ tending to paper "\vork and endeavoring, with }(Jr. Bueche
· the pla.in,tijf, to raise funds to carry on the work. His six
:' trips to ~ioab during this time were certainly not "for a
grand vacation" as plaintiff's brief (p. 22) puts it, (but
~ again without the support of anything except counsel's
~·imagination) but were necessary business trips which plain~. tiff himself urged ( Tr. 149, 151 and Pl. Ex. 9 and 10).
As ~Ir. Fowler, plaintiff's witness, testified, trips were
~,made by Mr. Conner from Chicago to Miners Basin and
Moab, and 11r. Bueche himself came on one occasion, and
1\tir. Fowler traveled to Chicago and met with Mr. Conner
m~ and Mr. Bueche ''for the purpose of trying to complete
i the arrangement of merging these properties" (Tr. 149).
~1; l\fr. Fowler was plaintiff's witness. He 'vas not called by
!rrdefendants. We do not disagree that Mr. Charles E.
,~Conner helped remove some trees from the road in Bache~ lor's Basin. (It was "trees" at Transcript 88, and was "a
~~.few trees'' at plaintiff's Brief p. 9. However, as counsel
1[became more enthused and careless, it becomes "a tree"
~at his brief, p. 16}. The simple fact is that Mr. Charles
~~eE· Conner did a great deal of work, and in the best of faith
~as the Court found, to bring about success of the project.

!;,

1

r

I['·

)~ As counsel must know, unless he considers his profession

:tn avocation, it is not only the axman who ''works''.
~~~ Plaintiff next refers to Tr. 98 to show that $608.00 was
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Plaintiff refers to Tr. 100· as showing that "approximately 3500 feet of roadway was bulldozed upon the mountainside which took 76 hours". Plaintiff's brief is again
carelessly incorrect. The witness at that point, Mr. Stocks,
testified that he was at the location "about two weeks"
and that the road which was built was "about around two
miles'' ( Tr. 99). Two miles is 10,560 feet, slightly more
than three times as great as plaintiff's careless generalization. Mr. Stocks testified (Tr. 100) that he worked 76 hours
on the road (which is very nearly two 40-hour weeks) but
that Mr. William Conner was also working with him, and,
asked whether there were "any other workmen there",
he also named Mr. Fowler (Tr. 100).
When plaintiff's brief says (citing but not quoting the
record) that ''approximately 3500 feet of roadway was
bulldozed upon the mountainside which took 76 hours",and it turns out that the actual figures were three times
that a1nount of footage and about three times as many
"\vork hours, we believe that brief ought not to be accepted
in its recitation of fact.
Plaintiff's brief next refers to Tr. 123 and 124 in support
of the statement that 1\fr. William Conner and }fr. Fuller
in 195·6 at Bachelor Basin ''did shovel dirt for a few hours
to clear out a portal." This statement, however, as it
appears in the transcript is :
''-we cleaned out the tunnel so it would be possible
for ~{r. Mateer to g·o in in case he came back."
Again, the enthusias1n of plaintiff is unrestrained by the
record.
Plaintiff's brief next refers to Tr. 137, 138 and 139 as
showing- that ~{r. Willian1 Conner n1oved to ~liners Basin
on June 5, 1955 "\vith the trailer in 'vhich he lived nnd with
that we do not disagree. He had, however, been there on
a number of trips earlier in 1955 as plaintiff concedes.
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Plaintiff says -that in the ·spring of 1955 ''the old mine
portal and tunnel were in a dangerous condition", with
which we also agree. He goes on to say,. ho\vever, that'' as of the latter part of 1956, said tunnel was still
in dangerous condition in that posts and caps had
rotted to the point of being nothing but pulp wood
( Tr. 139)."
This latter statement is unsupported by the record citation. The witness at this point, Mr. Fowler, could not
testify as to the condition of the tuinnel. He stated that
he believed it was dang~rous and ''I wouldn't go in''.
Obviously, therefore, Mr. Fowler· could not testify as to
the condition of the tunnel for by his own admission he
never looked at it in 1956. Plaintiff's brief, however,
seems perfectly willing to overlook. this fact and to tell
the Court as a fact something which the witness could
not say.
The Plaintiff refers to Tr. 144 as showing that :B,owler
was paid $150.00. However, plaintiff fails to state that
this very page shows that Mr. Fowler was paid by defendants "for 'vork done in connection with their claims" the
sum of $150.00 cash and ''a round trip ticket''-" to Chicago" ( Tr. 144). Surely plaintiff does not want to represent only half-truths to the Court.

The final portion of the transcript before plaintiff rested
his case is Tr. 148-152. This plaintiff refers to as showing that ''All of the meetings'' etc. referred to in our brief
occurred "in the summer of 1955, not early in 1956, as
· defendants would like one to believe.''

But Tr. 146, 147 without doubt discusses a
: tween Fowler and Bueche in October, 1956.
: true that discussions of merger w·ith Fow·le-r
: 1955, when Mr. Charles Conner was present.
t Bueche and Mr. Fowler discussed in October,
~:not know. However, the defendants ''would

rl'leeting beIt is quite
occurred jn
What Mr.
1956, we do
like one to
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believe·'' only the trut"h in. this case. The truth is that the
defendants actively worked on the project here involved
not only up to October 24, 1956, when this action was filed,
but long thereafter. Work did not cease in November,
1955, unless one conceives of ''work'' only as chopping
ice on top of the LaSal Mountains.
The fact is that active work in connection with the
project and in which Mr. Bueche participated continued
through a large part of 1956.
.As Mr. Bueche himself testified (Tr. 357), there was
a meeting in January, 1956 between ~Ir. Bueche, ~lr. Conner
and Mr. Horton, the subject of which was ''raising additional capital".
Mr. Bueche further testified as to a meeting in May,
1956, not relative to any account, concerning the work to
be done and attempts to raise money (Tr. 362). At the
end of that conference, Mr. Bueche, according to his own
testimony, said:

''I am not going to talk to you again if you don't get
something done so the geologists get up in the tunnel."
(Tr. 365).
Mr. Bueche further testified that he was subsequently
advised by a letter in 1956 (Tr. 364.)
''that the tunnel was cleared and I could send up
geologists on my O\vn again if I wished.''
This testin1ony by 1\!r. Bueche fully supports the testiInony by Mr. William Conner that he and ~Ir. Fuller in
1956

"cleaned out the tunnel so it would be possible for
Mr. l\{ateer to g·o in in case he came back" (Tr. 123,
124).

We respectfully submit that there is no evidence in the
record which could support a judgment for the plaintiff
his case (Tr. 160). Plaintiff's brief fully
when Sponsored
he rested
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sustains this contention and the only portions of the transcript which he refers to, before Tr. 160, either support
the defendants' contentions and disprove the allegations
of the complaint or they are carelessly and erroneously
represented for plaintiff's purposes.
The defendants' Motion to dismiss the complaint when
plaintiff rested should have been granted. Failure to
o-rant the Motion is reversible error.
;--,

Plaintiff's Point IV That a Party May Treat the Other's
Breach of an Agreement as an Offer to Rescind Is Neither
Sound in Law Nor Pertinent in Fact as Stated. by Plaintiff.
Under his Point IV, plaintiff contends that where one
party to an agreement has breached the agreement or defaulted, the other party may treat such conduct as an
offer to rescind ''and acquiesce in the desire so manifested
to abandon the contract''.
The portion enclosed in quotation marks in the preceding paragraph is plaintiff's words. We do not understand
them.
There was never at any time a breach or default by the
Conners, and if there was, it was waived by plaintiff.
Certainly if one party is in default or has committed a
breach such that the other party may treat it as an offer
to rescind (if that be sound law, which we doubt), the
latter party surely must promptly and clearly accept that
offer to rescind, communicating the acceptance to the part)r
said to be offering to rescind. Any other course would be
unjust and contrary to the most basic law.
The trial judge apparently thought that the defendants
were in default in November, 1955 simply because 1\tf.r.
William Conner had come down from Miners Basin to
Moab and away from those mining claims at that time.
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But no one could live and work at the, top of the LaSal
mountains in the winter and not even plaintiff regarded
that as a breach. Actually, Mr. Conner worked in the low
levels all winter.
Both the Court and plaintiff's counsel apparently regard
the fact that jeeps, trailers, tools, etc. had to be purchased
and were purchased for the project was in some way a
misuse of the Bueche money. The Court awarded ''rental
value'' for such items up to November, 1955, although it
is undisputed that they were used for the project right
up to the date of trial.
Yet, the plaintiff Mr. Bueche regarded these items as
property of the project and not wrongfully purchased out
of project funds.
In June, 1955, if he did not know so before as other proofs
seem clearly to establish, Mr. Bueche knew that the ''trailer,
Jeep and other vehicles and equipment were up in the
mountains" in use on the project (Tr. 351). That he knew
they were purchased from project funds in which he had
an interest was evidenced by the fact that he himself insisted that such equipment be brought down from the
mountains to l\{oab "during the "rinter" (Tr. 352).
It seems ridiculous to contend that purchase of such
equipment was not properly made out of project funds,
and then to have Mr. Bueche giving insistent instructions
as to their care. If they were not project property, what
business did Bueche have in saying where it should be
kept~

Furthermore, Mr. Bueche testified that he knew "between J nne, 1955 and August, 1955 that the trailer was
purchased with my n1oney" and that he "accepted that"
(Tr. 352).
That such equipment was, to be purchased and ,vas necessary 'vas known when the ag·reement was made. It ·was
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the very reason why $10,000.00 was needed at that time
and why the parties contemplated the need for additional
money in the near future.
There can be no doubt that Bueche knew that such equipment had to be purchased and that in any event he '' accepted" that situation in June, 1955.
There is no possible ground therefore for the Court not
to regard the expenditures for those items as perfectly
proper, and as property of the venture. There is no basis
whatsoever for allo,ving to defendants merely the ''rental
value'' thereof.
Nearly $6,000.00 therefore was invested in such necessary tools and equipment for the project right at its start.
This was fully known to Bueche. In November, 1955,
there remained some $750.00 in an Oak Park, Illinois bank
and $2,500.00 in the Moab bank. The tools and equipment
were still in existence of course at that time. Actually, the
expenditures for food, gas, etc. had been very low. How
then can anyone reasonably say that the project n1oney
'vas exhausted and therefore the project abandoned in
November, 1955~ Such an argument does not make sense.
The important thing, however, regardless of the argument, is. that Mr. Bueche did not regard the contract as
breached or terminated as late as May, 1956 (Tr. 362) nor
even at the time of trial ( Tr. 366) .
We submit that the Court was clearly wrong in stating
that after November, 1955 the parties "had no business
relations of any kind--except concerning an accounting-"
(Tr. 369).
That the Court was in error on this point of fact appears
without possible doubt from the transcript. The plaintiff,
Mr. Bueche, was discussing a meeting in May, 1956, with
l\Ir. Charles Conner. The following occurred:
''The Court: What the court is trying to find out
Law Library.
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November 1955 with· these gentlemen, except to try to
find out about this account T ·
The Witness: I was. • • • I was talking with Mr.
Conner up to May of 19·56. • * •
The Court: When you talked with him in May, was
that about your account Y
A. No." (Tr. 362, 363.)
The witness then explained the nature of the meeting
and discussions of what was to be done, and his demand
that they ' 'get something done so the geologists get up in
the tunnel" (Tr. 363).
The plaintiff, pressed by the Court, twice expressly denied that all was over in November, 1955 except for an
accounting. This error by the Court is expressly contrary to the evidence and cannot be sustained.
There was no termination or breach of the contract in
November, 1955 amounting to an offer to rescind and if
there was, Bueche did not accept it.
What then is the next breach or default by defendants!
The failure to report an account f The trial judge erroneously thought there had been a failure from November
1955 to March 1956 to render an account. If that was the
basis for a charge of default, 'vhen did it occurt Certainly not in November, 1955. The full records were
shown to plaintiff in January, 1956 and again in March,
1956 and again in June, 1956. Never at any time did plaintiff give any notice that he regarded a failure to give an
account an offer to rescind which he accepted. Nor did
plaintiff ever give notice that there was a breach by failure
to give an account until this artion 'vas filed many months
after a full account had been n1ade.
But Mr. Buechr did not regard the contract as breached
or abandoned and he did not act in any "~ay to accept "an
offer to rescind". Quite the contrary.
Mr. Bueche was firmly of the belief that the tunnel on
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the claims recorded in 1954 was rich in uranium. The
Conners did not believe this. to be true, much as they would
have liked it to be true. Mr. Bueche did not have the right
to direct where prospecting should be done. Nevertheless,
by his own words, he told the Conners in May, 1956 (Tr.
365):
''I am not going to talk to you again if you don't get
something· done so the geologists get up in the tunnel.''
So the Conners cleaned out the tunnel.
Did those 'vords by Bueche in May, 1956 indicate an
acceptance of an offer to rescind~ Did those words by
Bueche indicate that he stood upon a default terminating
the contract in November, 1955~
Most certainly those words by Bueche indicated that in
May, 1956 he still considered the contract in full force and
effect and that unless the Conners cleaned out the tunnel
he was going to be angry.
If there ever had been ground to terminate the agreement in November, 1955 or in the spring of 1956, Mr.
Bueche not only did not exercise it but, by his words and
conduct, waived it.
What act occurred after May, 19·56 that was a bre~ch of
the contract by defendants' None whatsoever I
Plaintiff's counsel contends that there having been a
breach by defendants (undefined) that such amounted to
an offer by defendants to rescind. If that theory were
sound, it would of course have to be followed by an acceptance of the so-called offer. But an acceptance of such an
offer would have to be promptly made and communicated
to the offeror. When and what was the acceptance?
In 1956, further prospecting and work on the claims,
even on the tunnel, was performed by the Conners. Work
on the tunnel was done in furtherance of Mr. Bueche's
express wishes and demands. As Mr. Bueche further said:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"I wanted to get that geologist in that tunnel further,
and really try to find out if there was something
there." (Tr. 364.)
Mr. William Conner, as was confirmed by two witnesses,
was up on the claims prospecting and working on the road
and on the tunnel with extra labor many times in 1956. He
prospected many other places within the area specified in
the contract in 1956. The Court allowed nothing for such
work whatsoever.

Near the close of the trial, Mr. Bueche made it perfectly
clear that he had not accepted any offer to rescind ever
made by defendants or brought about by operation of law
(even assuming the possibility thereof in this case, which
is clearly erroneous.). He was asked as to the contract:
'' Q. Well you neither repudiate it or say that it is
over or agree that the contract is terminated or anything of that nature, do you f
A. I never said anything like that. '' ( Tr. 365.)
'' Q. As far as you are concerned, until you get
that $10,000 back you still participate in the contract
and are entitled to any benefits that could come out
of it.
A. I assume so.'' ( Tr. 366.)

Mr. Bueche never accepted any offer to rescind of any
kind,-not even at the close of the trial.
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Conclusion.
Plaintiff's brief is replete with errors of fact. Its argument is unsound in law. It failed utterly to prove the
allegations of the complaint. The complaint should be
dismissed and an order should be entered reversing the
judgment and directing entry of an order dismissing the
complaint with costs to defendants.
Respectfully submitted,
RoBERT· H. RuGGERI,

First Security Bank Bldg.,
Moab, Utah,
WARREN C. HoRTON,
HoRToN, D:Avrs & McCALEB,
208 South LaSalle Street,
Chicago, Illinois,
Attorneys and Counsel for
Appellants.
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